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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Before us is an appeal from the order of the District 
Court granting a preliminary injunction enjoining 
enforcement of the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act 
(WDA or "Act"), V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, SS 76-79, a territorial 
law that declares that an employee discharged for any 
reason other than for cause as set forth in nine enumerated 
reasons "shall be considered to have been wrongfully 
discharged," unless modified by a union contract. The 
central issue is the District Court's holding that the 
 
plaintiffs have a probability of success on the merits on 
their claim that the WDA is preempted by the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. SS 151-169. The 
Government of the Virgin Islands and two intervening 
employees who have claims pending under the WDAfiled 
appeals, which we consolidated. 
 
We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the grant of the 
preliminary injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). 
Although the issuance of a preliminary injunction is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, the underlying legal 
determination regarding preemption is reviewed de novo. 
Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 652 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
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II. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
A. 
 
The Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act 
 
Section 76 of the WDA, enacted by the Virgin Islands 
legislature in 1986, sets forth the grounds for lawful 
employee discharge as follows: 
 
       (a) Unless modified by union contract, an employer 
       may dismiss any employee: 
 
       (1) who engages in a business which conflicts with his 
       duties to his employer or renders him a rival of his 
       employer; 
 
       (2) whose insolent or offensive conduct toward a 
       customer of the employer injures the employer's 
       business; 
 
       (3) whose use of intoxicants or controlled substances 
       interferes with the proper discharge of his duties; 
 
       (4) who wilfully and intentionally disobeys reasonable 
       and lawful rules, orders, and instructions of the 
       employer; provided, however, the employer shall not 
       bar an employee from patronizing the employer's 
       business after the employee's working hours are 
       completed; 
 
       (5) who performs his work assignments in a negligent 
       manner; 
 
       (6) whose continuous absences from his place of 
       employment affect the interests of his employer; 
 
       (7) who is incompetent or inefficient, thereby impairing 
       his usefulness to his employer; 
 
       (8) who is dishonest; or 
 
       (9) whose conduct is such that it leads to the refusal, 
       reluctance or inability of other employees to work with 
       him. 
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       (b) The Commissioner may by rule or regulation adopt 
       additional grounds for discharge of an employee not 
       inconsistent with the provisions enumerated in 
       subsection (a) of this section. 
 
       (c) Any employee discharged for reasons other than 
       those stated in subsection (a) of this section shall be 
       considered to have been wrongfully discharged; 
       however, nothing in this section shall be construed as 
       prohibiting an employer from terminating an employee 
       as a result of the cessation of business operations or as 
       a result of a general cutback in the work force due to 
       economic hardship, or as a result of the employee's 
       participation in concerted activity that is not protected 
       by this title. 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, S 76. 
 
Any employee covered by the WDA and discharged in 
violation of S 76 may file an administrative complaint with 
the Commissioner of Labor, who has the authority to order 
reinstatement and back pay. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, 
S 77. In addition, the employee may file a lawsuit for 
compensatory and punitive damages in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, S 79. 
 
As originally enacted, the text of S 76 began,"Unless 
modified by contract . . . ." In 1991, the Virgin Islands 
Department of Labor defined the term "contract" as a 
"written agreement negotiated between an employer and an 
employee, or representatives thereof, which contains the 
specific grounds for discharge, where the employment 
relationship has an established mechanism or procedure 
for resolving discharge grievances and this mechanism or 
procedure is referred to in the agreement or is otherwise 
known by the parties, such as a collective bargaining 
agreement." V.I.R. & Regs. tit. 24, S 77-1(E). Expressly 
excluded from that definition were printed statements on 
an application for employment, in employee manuals, or in 
statements of employers' rules. Id. However, in its 
administrative rulings, the Department later relaxed the 
definition by holding that the Department was deprived of 
jurisdiction under the WDA if an employee agreed in any 
contract, even an application for employment, that s/he 
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was an at-will employee. This interpretation permitted the 
employer to remove the protection of the Act by contracting 
with one or more individual employees. 
 
In 1996, the Virgin Islands legislature amendedS 76(a) to 
begin, "Unless modified by union contract . . .." See V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 24, S 76(a). Since that time,S 76(a) has been 
interpreted to apply to all employees in the Virgin Islands, 
absent a collective bargaining agreement setting discharge 
terms to the contrary. 
 
B. 
 
Procedural Background 
 
The District Court that issued the preliminary injunction 
in this case had previously considered the same issue in 
Bell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 40 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D.V.I. 
1999), a suit brought by a former employee alleging that 
she was discharged in violation of the WDA. The court held 
in Bell that the WDA was preempted by the NLRA and 
dismissed the employee's WDA action on that ground. Soon 
thereafter, the Department of Labor postponed all hearings 
then scheduled under the WDA. After a public hearing held 
by the Virgin Islands legislature on March 15, 1999, 
however, the Department of Labor announced that it would 
reschedule all hearings. The first hearing was rescheduled 
to commence on April 6, 1999. 
 
On April 5, 1999, the St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & 
Tourism Association, Inc., the St. Thomas-St. John 
Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and the St. Croix Hotel & 
Tourism Association, Inc. (collectively "the associations") 
filed this action in the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
seeking to restrain the enforcement of the WDA in any 
pending or future WDA wrongful discharge proceeding. The 
associations, relying on the District Court's earlier decision 
in Bell, alleged that the WDA was preempted by the NLRA 
and contended that enforcement of the Act deprived them 
of federal rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983. They 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2201, 2202, as well 
as injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and attorneys' 
 
                                6 
  
fees under 42 U.S.C. S 1988 and V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, 
S 541. 
 
The associations are three not-for-profit corporations that 
represent the interests of more than 800 employers on the 
islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix in the Virgin 
Islands. Together, their members employ over 12,000 
employees in the Virgin Islands. The associations named as 
defendants the Government of the Virgin Islands, the 
Department of Labor, and the Acting Commissioner of the 
Department of Labor (collectively "the government"). Elsa 
Huggins and Ladiah Whyte, two employees who have WDA 
claims pending before the Virgin Islands Department of 
Labor, intervened as additional defendants. 
 
The associations sought a preliminary injunction against 
the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, prohibiting it from 
holding any preliminary or formal hearings under the WDA. 
After a hearing, the District Court, adopting its earlier 
reasoning in Bell, concluded that the associations were 
likely to succeed on the merits of their preemption 
arguments and issued the requested preliminary 
injunction. St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Assoc., Inc. 
v. Government of the United States Virgin Islands , Civ. No. 
1999-54 (D.V.I. June 2, 1999) (hereafter "slip op."). The 
court believed that the WDA is "directly" preempted by S 7 
of the NLRA "because it requires union involvement before 
any contractual modification to the WDA's requirements," 
and also preempted because "it upsets the `balance of 
power' between labor and management in an area Congress 
intended to remain free [from regulation]." Slip op. at 6. 
 
The court's order permitted the Department of Labor to 
continue to accept complaints and to encourage voluntary 
mediation, and to hold formal hearings for employees who 
are not covered by the NLRA. It also required the 
associations to post a bond in the amount of $25,000 to 
cover losses to any employee who may ultimately be 
awarded back pay under the WDA and is unable to recover 
from the former employer. In their appeal, the government 
and intervening employees argue that the District Court 
erred as a matter of law in its determination that the WDA 
was preempted. 
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III. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
Preemption Principles 
 
An understanding of the principles of preemption is 
necessary background for all of the issues raised, including 
the appellants' challenge to standing, a jurisdictional issue. 
Preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution, which provides that the laws of 
the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land 
. . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
Those principles are made applicable to the laws of the 
Virgin Islands through the Revised Organic Act, which 
authorizes the Virgin Islands legislature to enact territorial 
laws that are "not inconsistent with . . . the laws of the 
United States made applicable to the Virgin Islands." 48 
U.S.C. S 1574(a). 
 
The NLRA, "a comprehensive code passed by Congress to 
regulate labor relations in activities affecting interstate and 
foreign commerce," Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 
U.S. 235, 238 (1967), expressly applies to the Virgin 
Islands, a territory of the United States. See  29 U.S.C. 
S 152(6). Accordingly, we must apply the preemption 
principles as articulated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. See, e.g., Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 
181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying general preemption 
principles to determine whether application of territorial law 
was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act). 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized three general ways in 
which federal law may preempt, and thereby displace, state 
law: (1) "express preemption," which arises when there is 
an explicit statutory command that state law be displaced, 
see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 
(1992); (2) "field preemption," which arises when federal law 
"so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make 
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reasonable the inference the Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it," Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotations omitted); and 
(3) "conflict preemption," which arises when a state law 
makes it impossible to comply with both state and federal 
law or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz , 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941). 
 
Because the NLRA contains no express preemption 
provision, and because the NLRA regulates in an area of 
law traditionally regulated by the states, any NLRA 
preemption analysis starts "with the basic assumption that 
Congress did not intend to displace state law." Building and 
Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders and 
Contractors of Mass./R.I., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) 
(quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).1 
Nonetheless, although the NLRA neither contains an 
express preemption provision nor indicates a congressional 
intent to usurp the entire field of labor-management 
relations, courts have often found state laws impliedly 
preempted by conflict with the NLRA, its express provisions 
as well as its underlying goals and policies, on the ground 
that the state law stands "as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives" of Congress. See, e.g., Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 
U.S. 107, 120, 134-35 (1994) (holding a state policy 
preempted by conflict with employee's right, implicit in the 
structure of the NLRA, to "complete the collective 
bargaining process and agree to an arbitration clause"); 
Nash, 389 U.S. at 238-40 (holding a state policy preempted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The associations argue that this assumption does not apply here 
because the WDA is a territorial law rather than a state law and, 
therefore, does not raise a problem of "dual sovereignties." Appellees' 
Brief at 10. We see no reason to alter our preemption analysis, which is 
premised on the purpose of Congress in enacting the NLRA, based on a 
distinction between the legislative power of the Virgin Islands and that 
of the states, nor have we seen such reason in the past. See Peter v. 
Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 903 F.2d 935, 937 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) ("For purposes 
of our [preemption] analysis, the Virgin Islands stands in no different 
position than would a state."). 
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by conflict with the NLRA because "Congress has made it 
clear that it wishes all persons with information about 
[unfair labor practices] to be completely free from coercion 
against reporting them to the Board"). 
 
Although the general preemption principles "are no less 
applicable in the field of labor law," Brown v. Hotel & 
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 
468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984), two unique subspecies of 
preemption, commonly known as Garmon preemption and 
Machinists preemption, are often invoked in connection 
with the NLRA. Garmon preemption, which derives from 
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 
(1959), protects the primary jurisdiction of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) by displacing state 
jurisdiction over conduct which is "arguably within the 
compass of S 7 or S 8 of the Act." Id. at 246. The doctrine 
is based on an "overriding interest in a uniform, nationwide 
interpretation of the federal statute by the centralized 
expert agency created by Congress," rather than on federal 
protection of particular conduct of private bargaining 
parties. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 
440 U.S. 519, 528 (1979) (plurality opinion). Because 
Garmon preemption concerns cases which "arguably" fall 
within the NLRA, a determination of whether state 
jurisdiction is displaced under Garmon preemption may 
require a consideration of the strength of the state's interest 
in its regulation over the relevant conduct. See Brown, 468 
U.S. at 502-03. 
 
In contrast to Garmon preemption, Machinists 
preemption, derived from Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 
(1976), is premised on congressional intent that certain 
conduct of private bargaining parties be unregulated. 
Machinists preemption can be described as a form of 
conflict preemption under which state regulation of the 
bargaining conduct of private parties is displaced because 
it conflicts with the purpose of Congress in enacting the 
NLRA to leave that conduct "to be controlled by the free 
play of economic forces." Id. at 140. 2 Although "[a]n 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As we have noted elsewhere, the distinction between conflict 
preemption and field preemption is "not necessarily airtight." Orson, 
Inc., 
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appreciation of the State's interest in regulating a certain 
kind of conduct may . . . be relevant in determining 
whether Congress in fact intended the conduct to be 
unregulated," because the doctrine of Machinists 
preemption is premised solely on congressional intent that 
an area of conduct be unregulated, an analysis under this 
doctrine does not require a balancing of the state and 
federal interests in the first instance. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749 n.27 (1985). 
 
A brief summary of the underlying facts in Machinists 
sheds light on the types of state regulation that are 
preempted under the doctrine. During negotiations for 
renewal of an expired collective-bargaining agreement, the 
employer sought and the union resisted an increase of the 
basic workweek from 37 to 40 hours. After a vote of the 
membership, the union instructed its members to refuse to 
work more than 37 hours. While negotiations continued, 
the employer filed a charge with the NLRB seeking a 
determination that the union's action was an unfair labor 
practice prohibited by S 8 of the NLRA. The NLRB dismissed 
the charge, finding that the union's conduct did not violate 
any provision of the NLRA. The employer also filed a 
complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission, charging that the refusal to work overtime 
constituted an unfair labor practice under state law. The 
state Commissioner granted an injunction that the union 
cease and desist encouraging the employees' concerted 
refusal to accept overtime assignments. This injunction was 
subsequently upheld by the state courts. 
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Drawing from 
earlier decisions, the Court held that even though the 
employees' concerted refusal to work overtime was neither 
prohibited nor protected under specific provisions of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 1999). "Indeed, field 
pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A 
state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' 
intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation." 
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n. 5 (1990). The overlap is 
evident in Machinists preemption, which recognizes an area within the 
field of labor-management relations where there is to be no state 
regulation. 
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NLRA, the NLRA nonetheless preempts state regulation of 
that conduct because the conduct is a "weapon of self-help" 
that Congress meant to leave unregulated. Machinists, 427 
U.S. at 146 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union , 346 U.S. 
485, 500 (1953)). 
 
B. 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Before we apply the principles of NLRA preemption to the 
case at hand, we consider first a question raised by the 
intervenors, joined by the government, with respect to the 
standing of the associations to challenge the WDA as 
preempted by conflict with S 7 of the NLRA. The issue of 
standing is jurisdictional. 
 
A declaratory judgment or injunction can issue only 
when the constitutional standing requirements of a"case" 
or "controversy" are met. See U.S. Const., Art. III, S 2; 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. , 312 U.S. 
270, 272 (1941). Although declaratory judgments are 
frequently sought in advance of the full harm expected, 
they must still present a justiciable controversy rather than 
"abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions." Alabama 
State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). 
We have explained that these standing requirements are 
satisfied when "there is a substantial controversy, between 
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment." Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse 
Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Maryland 
Casualty, 312 U.S. at 273 (1941)). 
 
That there is a substantial controversy between the 
parties here sufficient to meet the constitutional 
requirement of standing is evident. When the complaint 
was filed, the WDA was being enforced in the Virgin 
Islands. Employees had filed claims with the Department of 
Labor seeking relief under the Act. Hearings had been 
scheduled for April 6, 1999, and at least 12 employers 
scheduled for April hearings were members of the St. 
Thomas-St. John Hotel and Tourism Association. As a 
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consequence of the enforcement of the WDA, the employers' 
ability to freely discharge their employees or to contract for 
terms of discharge was limited as they would be subject to 
liability if they discharged their employees for reasons other 
than those stated in the challenged act. 
 
The associations, representing the interests of employers 
in the Virgin Islands, seek declaratory and injunctive relief 
from enforcement of the statute on the ground that the 
WDA is unenforceable because it is preempted by the NLRA,3 
and seek prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 against the Commissioner of Labor in her official 
capacity, alleging that by enforcing the WDA the 
Commissioner is violating their federal rights. The parties' 
interests in this action could not be more adverse, as the 
government and employees, both defendants here, seek to 
enforce the protections provided by the WDA, and the 
employers, through the associations, seek to avoid 
enforcement of those protections. 
 
The intervenors and the government do not question the 
associations' organizational standing to bring a cause of 
action challenging the statute on behalf of their member 
employers. Instead, the intervenors challenge the 
associations' ability to argue that the WDA is preempted 
based on conflict with S 7. 
 
The appellants claim that because employers, unlike 
employees, have no substantive rights under S 7, they are 
precluded from relying on S 7 for their preemption claim. 
Section 7 provides: 
 
       Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
       form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
       collectively through representatives of their own 
       choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
       for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
       aid or protection, and shall also have the right to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The associations also allege that "supervisors cannot be covered by the 
[WDA] pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Beasley v. Food Fair 
of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 662 (1974)." Compl. P 13. The 
District Court declined to decide that claim, and it is therefore not 
before 
us on appeal. 
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       refrain from any or all such activities except to the 
       extent that such right may be affected by an agreement 
       requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
       condition of employment as authorized in section 
       158(a)(3) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 157. 
 
It is indeed evident, as the appellants argue, thatS 7 
confers rights on employees rather than employers, but 
that is not determinative of the associations' standing to 
raise that issue. We know of no governing authority to the 
effect that the federal statutory provision which allegedly 
preempts enforcement of local legislation by conflict must 
confer a right on the party that argues in favor of 
preemption. On the contrary, a state or territorial law can 
be unenforceable as preempted by federal law even when 
the federal law secures no individual substantive rights for 
the party arguing preemption. See, e.g., California Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief brought by employers 
arguing that California state law was preempted by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which gives rights to 
pregnant employees under Title VII); Ray v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (action brought by a 
tanker company arguing that Washington Tanker Law was 
preempted by conflict with the Ports and Waterways Safety 
Act of 1972, which imposes operation, safety, and 
environmental requirements on tanker companies). 
 
But our conclusion that the associations have standing 
to bring this action challenging enforcement of the WDA 
does not end the jurisdictional inquiry, for the District 
Court must also have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
associations' claims. See 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a) (providing that 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands "shall have the 
jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States"); see 
generally Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court of 
the V.I., 923 F.2d 258, 260-64 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining 
jurisdictional system for civil actions in the Virgin Islands). 
 
Jurisdiction is established in this case under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. The associations seek injunctive and declaratory 
relief from enforcement of a territorial regulation on the 
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ground that the regulation is preempted by the NLRA, a 
federal statute which grants employers as well as 
employees substantive federal rights. See Golden State 
Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 108-12 (1989) 
(Golden State II) (holding that the NLRA confers a 
substantive right on employers and employees to be free of 
governmental regulation within the zone of Machinists 
preemption).4 The Supreme Court has recognized that such 
a challenge presents a federal question which the federal 
courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 to resolve. 
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 
(1983); see also Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. 
Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 259 n.6 (1985). 5 
 
C.  
 
Application of Preemption Principles to the WDA  
 
The associations argue, and the District Court agreed, 
that the WDA is preempted by the NLRA under the 
Machinists doctrine because it regulates conduct that 
Congress meant to leave unregulated. That argument is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The associations assert that, in addition to the right conferred by the 
NLRA under Machinists preemption, the NLRA also confers a substantive 
right of "voluntary unionism" on employers. Our research uncovered no 
case in which a court has recognized such a right. Moreover, even if 
such a right were to exist, we find questionable the District Court's 
assertion that the right would enure in the text ofS 7, see slip op. at 14 
(stating that "section 7 . . . guarantee[s] rights to employers as well as 
to employees"), rather than its being implicit in the structure and goals 
of the NLRA as a whole. In any event, we do not reach that issue in this 
case. 
 
5. In finding federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 we do not decide 
whether territorial officials in their official capacities are "persons" 
under 
S 1983 when sued solely for prospective injunctive relief. Cf. Ngiraingas 
v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 192 (1990) (holding that plaintiff who sought 
damages against territory of Guam and its officials in their official 
capacities could not state a S 1983 claim because the territory and its 
officials are not "persons" under the section). Nor do we decide whether 
the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.S 2201, applies to the 
Virgin Islands. Cf. 28 U.S.C. S 2201 (authorizing such relief by "any 
court of the United States"). 
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foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), and 
Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 
At issue in Metropolitan Life was a Massachusetts statute 
that required that specified minimum mental health care 
benefits be provided to a state resident who was insured 
under a general insurance policy, an accident or sickness 
insurance policy, or an employee health-care plan that 
covered hospital and surgical expenses. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. brought suit for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, arguing, inter alia, that the Massachusetts law was 
preempted by the NLRA under the Machinists doctrine 
"because Congress intended to leave the choice of terms in 
collective-bargaining agreements to the free play of 
economic forces." Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 748. After 
examination of the congressional concerns behind the 
enactment of the NLRA, the Court rejected the argument 
that state regulations imposing minimum substantive 
standards on contract terms are preempted under 
Machinists. As the Court explained: 
 
       The NLRA is concerned primarily with establishing an 
       equitable process for determining terms and conditions 
       of employment, and not with particular substantive 
       terms of the bargain that is struck when the parties 
       are negotiating from relatively equal positions. . .. The 
       evil Congress was addressing thus was entirely 
       unrelated to local or federal regulation establishing 
       minimum terms of employment. . . . No incompatibility 
       exists, therefore, between federal rules designed to 
       restore the equality of bargaining power, and state or 
       federal legislation that imposes minimal substantive 
       requirements on contract terms negotiated between 
       parties to labor agreements, at least so long as the 
       purpose of the state legislation is not incompatible with 
       the[ ] general goals of the NLRA. 
 
Id. at 753-55. 
 
The Court addressed a similar argument two years later 
in Fort Halifax. The state statute at issue in Fort Halifax 
required employers in Maine to provide a one-time 
severance payment to employees in the event of a plant 
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closing, unless the employee was "covered by a contract 
that deals with the issue of severance pay." 482 U.S. at 5. 
Employees of a closed packing plant, as well as the Maine 
Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, brought suit in 
state court for enforcement of the statute. On certiorari to 
the Supreme Court, the owner of the closed plant, like the 
insurer in Metropolitan Life, argued that preemption of the 
state statute was necessary under Machinists"to further 
Congress' intent that the conduct involved be unregulated 
because [it should be] left to be controlled by the free play 
of economic forces." Id. at 19-20 (internal quotations 
omitted). It argued that its case was not controlled by 
Metropolitan Life because the statutory obligation under the 
Maine statute applied only in the absence of an agreement 
between an employer and its employees. 
 
The Fort Halifax Court confirmed its holding in 
Metropolitan Life that a state law establishing a minimum 
employment standard is not preempted by the NLRA, 
adding that there is no preemption even when the state law 
permits parties to an employment agreement to contract 
out of the protections provided by the law. See id. at 22. 
The Court explained: 
 
       It is true that the Maine statute gives employees 
       something for which they otherwise might have to 
       bargain. That is true, however, with regard to any state 
       law that substantively regulates employment 
       conditions. Both employers and employees come to the 
       bargaining table with rights under state law that form 
       a "backdrop" for their negotiations. 
 
Id. at 21 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 757). 
 
Metropolitan Life and Fort Halifax clearly stand for the 
proposition that, in enacting the NLRA, Congress did not 
intend to prevent states from establishing minimum 
substantive requirements for contract terms. See generally 
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 754-55 (discussing goals of 
the NLRA). Although the associations insist that the WDA 
is not a minimum substantive requirement like the ones at 
issue in Metropolitan Life or Fort Halifax, they provide no 
principled basis for distinguishing the WDA from the 
statutes upheld in those cases. 
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The associations attempt to draw support from two cases 
decided in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In the 
first, the court held that a wrongful discharge claim 
brought by an employee under the Montana Wrongful 
Discharge from Employment Act, Mont. Code Ann. SS 39-2- 
901 et seq. (providing that discharge must be for good 
cause), was preempted by the NLRA. See Barnes v. Stone 
Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991). A look at the 
facts of Barnes reveals, however, that it is of little value 
here. 
 
The collective-bargaining agreement between Barnes's 
employer, Stone Container Corp., and his union expired 
and, after its extension for unsuccessful negotiations, the 
employer exercised its right to terminate the agreement and 
hired a number of replacement workers. Two of those new 
employees were sprayed with water at the work site, and 
Stone Container charged Barnes with the harassment of 
those employees and fired him. The union filed an unfair 
labor practice charge on behalf of Barnes, asserting that 
the stated reason for his discharge was pretextual and that 
Stone Container fired him for his union activity. After 
investigation, the NLRB found no basis for the retaliation 
charge and the union withdrew the complaint. 
 
Barnes then filed an action under the Montana wrongful 
discharge act, alleging dismissal without just cause. After 
Barnes had been discharged, the bargaining between his 
employer and union reached an impasse. The employer 
sought summary judgment from the federal court to which 
the action had been removed, arguing preemption under 
Machinists, because the wrongful discharge act would 
impose a just cause term where one did not exist. The 
district court denied summary judgment but the court of 
appeals reversed. The court held that permitting a wrongful 
discharge action during the period after contract expiration 
but before a bargaining impasse is the sort of entanglement 
Machinists sought to avoid, as it altered significantly the 
incentives to negotiate. The court did not invalidate the 
state statute but merely held its use in those unique 
circumstances was preempted. 
 
That the Barnes decision is limited to a narrow set of 
circumstances was made clear by the Ninth Circuit itself 
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the following year in National Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 
70 F.3d 69, 73 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that because a state 
statutory remedy was not invoked until after bargaining 
impasse was reached, "the type of interference with 
negotiations frowned upon in Barnes did not occur"). That 
set of circumstances is not present in this case. 
 
The second case out of the Ninth Circuit relied on by the 
associations, Chamber of Commerce of United States v. 
Bragdon, 64 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1995), is also 
distinguishable from this case. There, the court held that a 
county ordinance that required private employers to pay 
"prevailing wages" to employees on certain types of private 
industrial projects costing over $500,000 was preempted by 
the NLRA under Machinists preemption. See id. at 498. The 
court noted that imposition of such substantive 
requirements affects the bargaining process and could 
dictate the results of a contract, id. at 501, an undue 
governmental interference with the collective bargaining 
processes protected by the NLRA, id. at 504. 
 
Even if we were to agree with the Ninth Circuit that 
Metropolitan Life and Fort Halifax permit the extension of 
Machinists preemption to displace state law that imposes 
substantive minimum requirements for contract terms 
rather than regulates the use of economic bargaining 
weapons, see id. at 501, the county ordinance at issue in 
that case is remarkably different from the WDA. In 
establishing nine statutory bases for lawful discharge in the 
Virgin Islands, the WDA neither regulates the process of 
bargaining nor upsets the balance of power of management 
on one side and labor on the other that is established by 
the NLRA. 
 
Instead, the WDA is directed to limiting the permissible 
bases for discharge of an employee to a broad list, 
including, inter alia: engaging in conflicting business; 
engaging in insolent or offensive conduct; using intoxicants 
or controlled substances that affect the employee's work; 
disobeying reasonable rules or instructions; being 
negligent, incompetent, inefficient, dishonest, or unable to 
work with others; and, regardless of the employee's 
behavior, economic hardship of the employer. See  V.I. Code 
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Ann. tit. 24, S 76. This appears to be a comprehensive list, 
covering all or almost all legitimate reasons for discharge. 
 
The associations also argue that the WDA cannot be a 
minimum employment standard because it treats union 
and non-union employees differently by permitting the 
union to contract its members out of the protections 
provided by the WDA but not permitting non-union 
employees to contract out of the protections. They argue 
that this opt-out for union employees "forces" unionization, 
triggering preemption by conflict with S 7 and the 
Machinists doctrine. 
 
Our analysis of this alternative argument is guided by the 
Supreme Court's discussion in Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 
U.S. 107 (1994). A California state law guaranteed to all 
California workers immediate payment of wages upon 
discharge. Livadas, an employee of Safeway supermarket, 
was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement which 
provided for binding arbitration for disputes as to the 
interpretation or application of the agreement, including 
grievances arising from allegedly unjust discharge or 
suspension. Id. at 110. When Livadas was discharged, she 
demanded her payment immediately, but the store manager 
refused, instead sending her payment by mail. Livadas filed 
an administrative claim against Safeway for a statutory 
penalty for the three-day delay caused by the mailing, but 
the Commissioner of Labor refused to enforce the claim 
because Livadas was covered by a collective-bargaining 
agreement containing an arbitration clause. Livadas then 
filed suit, asserting that the Commissioner's non- 
enforcement policy was preempted. 
 
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the 
Commissioner's policy was preempted by the NLRA because 
it forced Livadas to choose between exercising her state law 
right to immediate payment and exercising her right to 
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with an 
arbitration clause. See id. at 117. In doing so, the Court 
distinguished Fort Halifax, which involved a minimum 
employment standard with an opt-out provision, in part on 
the ground that "the minimum protections of Maine's plant- 
closing law were relinquished not by the mere act of signing 
an employment contract (or collective-bargaining 
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agreement), but only by the parties' express agreement on 
different terms." Id. at 131. The Court stated: 
 
       While the Commissioner and her amici call our 
       attention to a number of state and federal laws that 
       draw distinctions between union and nonunion 
       represented employees, virtually all share the 
       important second feature observed in [Fort Halifax], 
       that union-represented employees have the full 
       protection of the minimum standard, absent any 
       agreement for something different. These `opt out' 
       statutes are thus manifestly different in their operation 
       (and their effect on federal rights) from the 
       Commissioner's rule that an employee forfeits his 
       state-law rights the moment a collective-bargaining 
       agreement with an arbitration clause is entered into. 
       Hence, our holding that the Commissioner's unusual 
       policy is irreconcilable with the structure and purposes 
       of the Act should cast no shadow on the validity of 
       these familiar and narrowly drawn opt-out provisions. 
 
Id. at 131-32 (citations omitted). In a footnote, the Court 
added: "Nor does is seem plausible to suggest that 
Congress meant to pre-empt such opt-out laws, as 
`burdening' the statutory right of employees not to join 
unions by denying nonrepresented employees the `benefit' 
of being able to `contract out' of such standards." Id. at 132 
n.26. 
 
The Supreme Court's discussion in Livadas thus 
supports a conclusion that the WDA is not preempted by 
the NLRA even though it provides an opt-out by express 
terms of union contract. Like the Maine statute at issue in 
Fort Halifax, and unlike the California Commissioner's 
policy in Livadas, the WDA does not force an employee to 
choose between collective bargaining and the protections of 
state law; rather, it protects all Virgin Islands employees, 
but gives employees the option of relinquishing the 
territorial statutory protections through the terms of a 
collective-bargaining agreement. 
 
We are not alone in our conclusion that state minimum 
employment requirements are not inconsistent with the 
NLRA even when they provide for a union contract opt-out. 
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We have seen no case in which a court of appeals has 
decided otherwise. Indeed, there are several cases in which 
the Court of the Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an 
opt-out provision for union contracts did not trigger 
preemption by the NLRA. See Viceroy Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 
75 F.3d 482, 490 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that statute 
limiting mine workers to an 8-hour day unless otherwise 
provided in a collective bargaining agreement is not 
preempted); National Broadcasting Co., 70 F.3d at 73 
(holding that state regulations requiring employers to pay 
double time for all hours worked over 12 hours in a day 
unless the employees were covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement providing specified minimum 
overtime benefits are not preempted). 
 
Underlying the associations' argument and the District 
Court's opinion in this case is the unsettling supposition 
that by enacting the WDA the Virgin Islands legislature is 
regulating in an area that has traditionally been left to the 
freedom of contract between an employer and an employee. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that Machinists  
preemption does not extend into the realm of establishment 
of minimum employment standards like that established by 
the WDA. Moreover, the Court has cautioned that"[i]n 
labor pre-emption cases . . . our office is not to pass 
judgment on the reasonableness of state policy." Livadas, 
512 U.S. at 120. It appears that the determination of the 
Virgin Islands legislature that its citizens are in need of 
minimum employment protections falls within the 
precedent established by the Supreme Court that such 
legislation is not preempted by the NLRA. 
 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have determined that the District Court's conclusion 
that the associations have a likelihood of success on the 
merits of their claim that the WDA is preempted by the 
NLRA under the Machinists doctrine or by conflict with S 7 
was based on erroneous legal analysis. It follows that we 
will vacate the District Court's order granting the 
preliminary injunction. 
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It is apparent that although the District Court referred to 
testimony introduced by the associations at the hearing on 
the preliminary injunction, that testimony was not factual 
and the District Court relied on its earlier legal ruling in 
Bell as the basis for its preemption decision. At argument, 
the parties seemed to agree that there are no factual issues 
to be decided and no further evidence to be taken that 
would be relevant to a ruling on a permanent injunction. 
The Supreme Court has counseled that "if a district court's 
ruling rests solely on a premise as to the applicable rule of 
law, and the facts are established or of no controlling 
relevance, that ruling may be reviewed even though the 
appeal is from the entry of a preliminary injunction." 
Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 
757 (1986). However, we have not asked the parties to brief 
this issue and there remains for decision by the District 
Court the associations' claim that the WDA should not be 
applied to supervisors. Accordingly, we will not presume to 
go further than the appellants request, i.e. that we vacate 
the preliminary injunction, and we will remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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